Economic outlook: U.S. exceptionalism may persist amid global stagnation
In our January 2024 Cyclical Outlook, “Navigating the Descent,” we projected stagnant to modestly contractionary global economic conditions this year as the effects of tight monetary policy took hold. So far, that scenario has generally played out across all DM economies – except the U.S. Despite technical recessions in the U.K., Sweden, and Germany, and stagnant growth elsewhere, the U.S. economy has carried its surprising 2023 strength into early 2024 (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Economic growth has diverged between the U.S. and other developed markets
We believe that U.S. growth has likely peaked and will gradually decelerate toward the rest of DM this year. Yet the factors that have contributed to U.S. resilience could continue to support the (still-slowing) U.S. economy for a while longer. We would argue that there are five main factors at play:
1) Larger pandemic-related fiscal stimulus and still-elevated federal deficits have bolstered U.S. demand relative to other regions.
To be sure, U.S. savings balances have dwindled materially, especially for households at middle or lower income levels, and will continue to be eroded by above-target inflation rates over our cyclical horizon – further reason to believe that U.S. growth will slow.
However, estimated savings balances in other DM countries are more fully depleted. U.S. consumers have also been increasingly willing to take on more debt to smooth consumption. Therefore, some cyclical outperformance in the U.S. may continue.
2) Other economies are proving more sensitive than the U.S. to higher interest rates.
In other DM economies, the pass-through of monetary policy happens rapidly via higher interest costs on consumer debt and shorter-term, floating-rate mortgages. By contrast, U.S. households with low fixed-rate mortgages have been more insulated from Fed hikes, while benefiting from higher yields on savings. Furthermore, tighter credit conditions and declining economy-wide credit flows haven’t had the usual effect of slowing growth, as still-elevated savings from government transfers have reduced dependence on credit.
Despite weakness in U.S. regional banks, most holders of high quality, low-rate bonds – including the Fed, large banks, foreign reserve managers, and households (to name a few) – have weathered well the mark-to-market losses of higher rates without triggering a systemic event. Other areas of the economy that are more rate-sensitive, including the commercial real estate (CRE) and bank loan markets, remain a source of potential fragility. Overall, we believe these risks to the broader U.S. economy are manageable.
3) Europe and Southeast Asia appear less insulated than the U.S. from Chinese import competition.
Recent U.S. legislation, such as the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), has promoted U.S.-based industries, notably through tax credits contingent upon domestic production. The U.S. also relies less on exports for economic growth than many countries, while it benefits from access to affordable domestic energy sources. Additionally, the U.S. continues to impose tariffs on Chinese exports.
To sustain its growth objectives amid a deep property sector downturn, China has capitalized on its ability to subsidize its manufacturers. That has allowed producers to export inexpensive goods, especially in renewable energy investment categories such as electric vehicles and solar infrastructure. This will likely contribute to global deflationary forces, with varying regional impacts (see Figure 2).
China is also seeking to broadly increase its production efficiency in lower-quality goods. Southeast Asian countries that have benefited from Western supply chain diversification could face pressure. At the same time, China has made high-end manufacturing a policy priority. The euro area, and Germany in particular, appear to be at a relative disadvantage.
Figure 2: Import prices for goods manufactured abroad have fallen more in Europe than in the U.S.
4) U.S. companies are at the forefront of AI technologies, creating significant wealth effects even before productivity gains are realized.
The U.S.’s leading position in the global AI innovation race is supported by a vibrant startup ecosystem, substantial private equity funding, and advanced semiconductor manufacturing technology. U.S. export controls, though imperfect, will likely continue to restrict China’s progress.
The AI boom could be somewhat inflationary in the near term – based on the demand-boosting wealth effect of strong equity performance and deep pools of available capital – before the deflationary impact from higher productivity sets in. We are optimistic that AI can generate productivity gains over our longer-term secular horizon, even as questions about implementation lags and magnitude remain.
5) The balance of risks for the outcome of the U.S. presidential election leans toward policies that would be marginally supportive of U.S. growth and potentially detrimental elsewhere.
The U.S. election in November looms as an inflection point for global geopolitics and trade, with shifting risks to the investment landscape that we will continue to monitor.
Another Donald Trump presidency would likely put pressure on NATO and focus on more aggressive protectionist trade policies. This, coupled with domestic deregulation and an extension in certain tax cuts, could support U.S. growth and inflation cyclically, despite potential longer-term costs to domestic productivity and economic dynamism.
If President Joe Biden were to win another term, he would likely extend many of the 2017 Trump tax cuts, expand the Child Tax Credit, and keep, if not grow, the U.S.-oriented industrial policies put into place in his first administration.
Implications for inflation and global divergence
Those factors supporting relative U.S. growth are also likely to contribute to stickier inflation in the U.S. in 2024. As inflation cools globally (see Figure 3), we believe core consumer price index (CPI) inflation in the U.S may end the year in the area of 3% to 3.5%. Personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation, the Fed’s preferred gauge, could be in the 2.5% to 3% area at year-end, in our view, while inflation in the euro area could average 2% to 2.5%.
Figure 3: DM inflation has cooled at varying rates
With policy rates at cyclical peaks (see Figure 4), DM central banks are broadly signaling a midyear start to their easing cycles. (For details, see our March blog post, “One Hike, Three Hints, and a Surprise Rate Cut.”) We believe the pace of subsequent cuts could be faster, and the year-end 2025 destination rate could be lower, outside the U.S.
Although a soft landing that avoids recession appears within reach across regions, significant uncertainties remain. A positive shift in economic supply, decelerating inflation, and falling rates have been key characteristics of past soft landings, according to our analysis of central bank rate-hiking cycles from the 1960s to today. All of these elements gained traction in 2023.
Nevertheless, when examining the distribution of risks, we expect both inflation and recession risks to remain higher than usual in the wake of the unique disruptions caused by the pandemic. In the U.S., persistent inflationary risks look most elevated. Elsewhere, recession risks are still a chief concern.
Figure 4: DM central bank policy rates will likely diverge after rising in relative unison
A critical factor will be the degree of leeway central banks have in tolerating inflation levels that exceed their stated targets. The Fed, unlike other central banks focused solely on price stability, has a broader dual mandate that includes managing the trade-off between inflation and employment. As a result, it would likely take a notable reacceleration in U.S. inflation across a broad range of components for the Fed to consider hiking rates again, which officials have indicated they would prefer not to do.
That suggests the balance of risks related to Fed policy may tilt toward more rate cuts, despite remarkably resilient labor markets, which in turn may support somewhat above-target inflation for a while longer. The extent to which the Fed is willing to accept somewhat above-target inflation for any extended period remains a key question for the outlook.